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ENTITLEMENTS IN CONTEMPORARY MARKETS
“You got to know when to hold’em, know
know when to walk away, and know when to run.”1

when

to

123
fold’em,

I. INTRODUCTION
This article’s thesis is that FINRA Conduct Rule 2310,2 FINRA’s “suitability
should be interpreted to govern all broker-customer communications that
constitute non-trivial investment advice regarding portfolio composition, not just
buy, sell or exchange communications, per current interpretation (the “BSE
Interpretation”).4 Because acting on advice to hold a security (a “Holding Claim”)5
can affect risk just as significantly as a recommendation to buy, sell or exchange
one,6 the BSE Interpretation leaves a large body of investment advice affecting
rule,”3

1
KENNY ROGERS, The Gambler, on THE GAMBLER (United Artists 1978). This article is a modified
version of a considerably longer work of the same name published as Chapter 15 in 2008 SECURITIES
ARBITRATION (P.L.I., N.Y. 2008).
2
FINRA, Conduct Rule 2310, Recommendations to Customers (Suitability), available at
http://finra.complinet.com/finra/display/display.html?rbid=1189&record_id=1159000499&element_id=
1159000500&highlight=2310#r1159000499 (last visited Jan. 6, 2009). By order dated July 26, 2007,
the Securities and Exchange Commission approved the National Association of Securities Dealers’ and
New York Stock Exchange Regulation’s proposed consolidation of their respective member regulatory
operations under a single organization: the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). Self
Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-56145, 2007 WL 5185330 (July 26, 2007),
refer to the conduct rules by “FINRA” rather than the “NASD” prefix contained in the FINRA
Transitional Rulebook, which consists of two sets of rules: (1) NASD Rules and (2) the rules
incorporated from NYSE (Incorporated NYSE Rules).
3
See Richard A. Booth, The Suitability Rule, Investor Diversification, and Using Spread to
Measure Risk, 54 Bus. Law. 1599, 1599-1600 (1999) (“This simple sounding admonition, which has
come to be known as the "suitability rule," is one of the most ill-defined concepts in all of securities law
. . . . Yet, suitability is one of the most common issues arising in disputes between brokers and
customers. Indeed, there are several thousand cases filed each year in which aggrieved investors allege
financial harm resulting from broker recommendations of unsuitable securities or investment
strategies.”) (footnotes omitted).
4
See Frederick Mark Gedicks, Suitability Claims and Purchases of Unrecommended Securities: An
Agency Theory of Broker-Dealer Liability, 37 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 535, 541-43 & nn.12-14 (2005)
(discussing widespread agreement among courts, commentators and regulators that broker-dealers have
no liability on suitability grounds absent a recommendation).
5
See John R. Bielema, Jr. and Michael P. Carey, State Law Securities “Holding” Claims and
SLUSA Preemption, 15 A.B.A. Sec. Litig. J. 1 (Fall 2004) (defining “holding claims” as a “subset of
securities fraud litigation that has long been disfavored under federal law and has until recently been
largely ignored under state law”; noting California, New York and Texas have approved such claims);
Amanda M. Rose, Life After SLUSA: What is the Fate of Holding Claims?, 69 Def. Couns. J. 455, 46163 (2002) (arguing holding claims have no clear definition, “involve no transactional element,” and
“concern the static relationship between a shareholder and corporation, a substantive relationship
defined consistently. . . by state law.”); Andrew Edison, Holding Claims: An Emerging Cause of Action
for Securities Fraud, ANDREWS LITIGATION REPORTER, Oct. 6, 2004, at 1, available at
http://www.bracewells.com/files/tbl_s16Publications%5CFileUpload77%5C1169%5CEdisonComm.pd
f.
6
Booth, supra note 3, at 1600 (“Most courts and commentators seem to agree that the most
important factor to be considered in connection with suitability is risk. . . There are few cases, however,
in which courts have attempted to quantify risk. In most cases, the courts do little more than attach
impressionistic labels such as "growth," "income," or "speculative" to individual securities.”) (footnotes
omitted); Robert N. Rapp, Rethinking Risky Investments for that Little Old Lady: A Realistic Role for
Modern Portfolio Theory in Assessing Suitability Obligations of Stockbrokers, 24 OHIO. N.U. L. REV.
189, 227-30 (1998).
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customer portfolio risk unregulated by suitability standards.7 Such interpretation
not only fails to reflect Rule 2310’s well recognized customer-protective purposes,
but effectively transmogrifies Rule 2310 into a shield for wrongdoing, neutralizing
Rule 2310’s ability to serve as a bulwark against the potential misconduct of
inherently conflicted securities commission salespersons.8
Because FINRA’s interpretation of the suitability rule is itself unsuited to the
task of protecting securities customers, it should be rejected. Rather than governing
only the purchase, sale or exchange of securities, the rule should be understood to
encompass recommendations to hold securities. Part II describes FINRA’s
historical interpretation of Rule 2310, the meaning of the term “recommendation,”
relevant FINRA notices to members and a number of awards adopting a broad
interpretation of “recommendation.” Part III describes state “holding claim” cases
and arguments supporting Holding Claims made under agency principles.9 Part IV
discusses broker advertising, assessing the legitimacy of Holding Claims in light of
the types of statements brokers have been making to induce potential customers to
trade with their registered representatives.
II.
A. Rule 2310 and FINRA’s BSE Interpretation
Rule 2310 provides, in relevant part: “In recommending to a customer the
purchase, sale or exchange of any security, a member shall have reasonable
grounds for believing that the recommendation is suitable. . . .”10 FINRA has
refused to define “recommendation,11 narrowly construing it, and taking the
7
See Howard M. Friedman, On Being Rich, Accredited and Undiversified: The Lacunae in
Contemporary Securities Regulation, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 291, 315-16 (1994).
8
Commentators have discussed this conflict. See, e.g., Norman S. Poser, Liability of BrokerDealers for Unsuitable Recommendations to Institutional Investors, 2001 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1493, 1525
(2001) (“The motivation to sell risky securities (and not to disclose their risk adequately) that the
compensation system creates applies to sales efforts aimed at institutional as well as individual
investors. The selling-practice problems driven by the securities industry's compensation system have
thus far resisted efforts for reform. . . Institutional finance officers, whether sophisticated or not, are
often barraged by sales pitches from their self-styled financial counselors, who are in reality highly paid
and thus highly motivated salesmen and saleswomen.”). In the context of holding claims, brokers,
without liability exposure, might carelessly advise customers to hold securities, to give the appearance
that they are delivering services beyond the scope of their contractual obligations, leading customers to
believe they are receiving valuable investment advice on the cheap.
9
See Stuart D. Root, Suitability – the Sophisticated Investor – and Modern Portfolio Management,
1991 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 287, 330 n.131 ("A broker, informed of a customer's investment objectives
and informed of the security's characteristics, has a duty to warn of any unsuitability of which it is
aware. This flows either from the Rules of Fair Trade or principles of agency, or both." (citing
Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 381)). See generally Rapp, supra note 6, at 195-202 (connecting the
suitability rule’s evolution to its doctrinal underpinnings in agency and fiduciary law).
10
FINRA, supra note 2.
11
See Michael K. Wolensky, Securities Law And The Internet Enforcement Issues: Application of
Suitability Obligations, in SECURITIES LAW & THE INTERNET 251, 257 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice,
Course Handbook Series No. 00BS, 1999) (NASD has refused to define the term “recommendation” as
used in Rule 2310); Nancy C. Libin and James S. Wrona, The Securities Industry and the Internet: A
Suitable Match?, 01 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 601, 614 & nn.36-39 (2001) (“[T]he suitability rule applies
only to securities that the broker-dealer ‘recommends’ to customers. . . [FINRA] has not expressly
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position that recommendations must be buy, sell or exchange communications, but
not communications by brokers which advise customers to retain securities.12
The BSE Interpretation is supported by the literal language of Rule 2310 and
is consistent with federal cases requiring the purchase or sale of a security to
permit Rule 10b-5 plaintiff standing.13 Although courts and commentators have
recognized that suitability standards have historically applied only to buy, sell, or
exchange recommendations,14 the BSE Interpretation has recently come under
substantial criticism.15
It is important to determine what types of broker communications Rule 2310
covers not only because that determination is critical to the resolution of arbitral
disputes involving Holding Claims but because it is likely to substantially
influence how broker-dealers conduct themselves with respect to investment
advice they already routinely provide.
B. FINRA General Guidance as to how to Identify “Recommendations”
FINRA has, on occasion, attempted to clarify the term “recommendation.”
In an April, 2001, Notice to Members, for example, FINRA provided guidance to
members with respect to Rule 2310 and FINRA’s “Recommendation
Requirement.” 16 Although the Notice’s “Policy Statement” directly concerned sodefined what constitutes a ‘recommendation,’ and there is little case law on the issue. . . The cases that
have discussed the scope of the term ‘recommendation’ fail to provide clear guidance.” (citing, inter
alia, Rafael Pinches, Exchange Act Release No. 41816, 1999 SEC LEXIS 1754, at *20 n. 22 (Sept. 1,
1999) (securities purchased on customer’s behalf, but not authorized by client deemed “implicitly
recommended within the meaning of [FINRA] rules”)). Libin and Wrona argue that because the term
“recommendation” is not defined, the question whether a particular transaction is recommended
depends on analysis of all relevant circumstances and facts. Such analysis will, per the commentators,
depend on the communication's content, context, and presentation and, in particular whether the
communication could reasonably be viewed as a 'call to action,' or suggestion that the customer engage
in a particular transaction. The more individually tailored a communication to a customer is about a
security or group of securities, the more likely the communication will be viewed as a recommendation
that triggers suitability obligations. Some of FINRA’s Notices to Members discussing how members
can determine whether their communications with customers constitute “recommendations,” within the
meaning of Rule 2310, are discussed infra, at notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
12
See Rapp, supra note 6, at 204 n.62, ("Under this narrow interpretation of [FINRA’s] own
suitability rule, salesmen might be encouraged to learn as little as possible about the customers to whom
they recommend securities." (quoting House Comm. On Interstate & Foreign Commerce, Report of the
Special Study of Securities Markets of the SEC & Exch. Comm'n, H.R. Doc. No. 95 (1963))).
13
See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 734-36 (1975).
14
See Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Suitability in Securities Transactions, 54 BUS.
LAW. 1557, 1560 (1999) (“Rule 2310(a) is limited by its express terms to recommendations. . . the
majority of the authorities are consistent in the position that the suitability obligation is imposed on a
broker-dealer only in the context of a recommendation.”). The authors note further that the “definition
of a ‘recommendation’ within the context of Rule 2310(a) raises difficult questions of interpretation,”
and that “a broad range of circumstances may cause a transaction to be considered recommended.”). Id.
15
See, e.g., Gedicks, supra note 4, at 569-575 (characterizing brokers as mere “order clerks” to
support recommendation requirement is contrary to broker-dealer advertising, particularly at full service
firms; arguing that the common law of agency and shingle theory support a duty to warn customers of
unsuitable transactions and, consequently, support a rejection of the “recommendation requirement”).
Id.
16
NASD, NOTICE TO MEMBERS 01-23, 1, ONLINE SUITABILITY: SUITABILITY RULE AND ONLINE
COMMUNICATIONS 1 (Apr. 2001),
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/rules_regs/documents/notice_to_members/p003887.pdf.
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called “On-line Suitability,” FINRA’s views set forth in its Policy Statement are,
per its own commentary, relevant to the interpretation of Rule 2310 more
generally.17 The Policy Statement was intended to provide guidance to members
trying to determine when a “recommendation,” within the meaning of FINRA
rules, occurred. FINRA began by explaining what the Policy Statement was not
intended to do:
[FINRA] Regulation emphasizes. . . that this current Policy Statement does not (1)
alter member obligations under the suitability rule or (2) establish a “bright line”
test for determining whether a communication does or does not constitute a
“recommendation” for purposes of the suitability rule. No single factor discussed
below, standing alone, necessarily dictates the outcome of that analysis.18

Part of FINRA’s affirmative guidance was detailed as follows:
As [FINRA] Regulation has often emphasized “[w]hether a particular transaction is
in fact recommended depends on an analysis of all the relevant facts and
circumstances”. . . the “facts and circumstances” determination of whether a
communication is a “recommendation” requires an analysis of the content, context,
and presentation of the particular communication or set of communications. . . . An
important factor in this regard is whether – given its content, context, and manner
of presentation –a particular communication from a broker/dealer to a customer
reasonably would be viewed as a “call to action,” or suggestion that the customer
engage in a securities transaction. . . the more individually tailored the
communication to a specific customer. . . the greater likelihood that the
communication may be viewed as a recommendation.19 (emphasis added).

In its conclusion, FINRA cautioned members to remember that the
customer’s best interests must continue to be of paramount importance in any
setting, traditional or online.20 In a subsequent clarification of the Policy
Statement phrase “call to action,” FINRA wrote: “A customer could reasonably
discern a ‘call to action’ by receiving an e-mail or reading a web posting that,
objectively considered, suggests that the customer take concrete steps to bring his
or her investment portfolio into line with one suggested by the broker-dealer.”21
In the context of Holding Claims, the phrase “call to action” is vague.
Linguistically, advising a customer to maintain his or her portfolio composition
can be described as advice to essentially “do nothing.” A “call to action” seems,
on its face, to require advice to the customer that he or she “do something,” i.e., by
acting to change the current state of affairs by some form of “affirmative” conduct.
Commentators, however, have noted that there are forms of conduct, even if
properly described for some purposes or perspectives as “doing nothing,” that may,
nevertheless, be properly and simultaneously characterized as “legally” doing
17
Id. at 1 & n.3 (“Although the focus of this Policy Statement is on the application of the suitability
rule to electronic communications, much of the discussion is also relevant to more traditional
communications such as discussions made in-person over the telephone, or through postal mail.”). Id.
18
Id. at 1.
19
Id. at 2.
20
Id. at 5.
21
FINRA Policy Statement: Online Suitability (May 10, 2001) available at http://www.finra.org/
Industry/Regulation/Notices/2001/p003886.
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something.22 Here, advice to hold securities may be viewed, economically, as
effectively the same thing as recommending that the customer purchase them for
his or her account, a subject discussed in detail below.23 Thus, advice to hold
securities may properly be viewed as a “call to action,” with respect to portfolio
composition.
In the phrase “engage in a securities transaction,”24 the terms “engage” and
“transaction” are vague. The term “engage” suggests affirmative or active conduct
– conduct in which a customer “engages.” Since the composition of a portfolio is
altered by purchasing or selling of securities, it is normal to think of securities
transactions in terms of the buying and selling of securities. Even if the customer’s
decision to act on a broker’s advice by holding a security is not a “transaction,” it
is, nevertheless, equivalent to a transaction, from the perspective of portfolio risk.
The phrase “individually tailored”25 seems applicable to advice from broker’s to
hold securities because such advice reflects the broker’s understanding of the
coincidence of the customer’s account objectives and the risk/reward attributes of
the subject portfolio. The phrase “bring into line”26 is more complex as it
implicitly suggests that something, in the sense of affirmative conduct, is being
advocated as a means to change what already exists.
C. Arbitration Awards, Administrative Decision and “Recommendations”
Notwithstanding FINRA’s BSE interpretation of the term “recommendation”
and historical judicial recognition of the BSE Interpretation, some FINRA panels
have reached results at odds with FINRA’s interpretation of Rule 2310.27 In some
cases, arbitral panels have broadly construed conduct that does not appear to
directly fall within the buy/sell/exchange structure.28 In other arbitrations, panels
have permitted recovery in the apparent absence of any “recommendation.”29
In Peterzell v. Charles Schwab & Co., for example, claimant traded options,
steadily increasing his financial exposure, incurring losses of $133,000.30 He sued
discount broker Schwab, claiming it violated suitability obligations by allowing
him to continue trading.31 A FINRA Panel concluded that Schwab should have
stopped Peterzell, even though the firm had neither provided advice nor any

22
See, e.g., Laurence A. Steckman & Peter Daily, Attorney Inaction as Trial Strategy: A Study of
the Effects of Judicial Use of Non-action Neutral Language on the Analysis and Adjudication of Claims
of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Under the Sixth Amendment, 6 J. SUFFOLK ACAD. L.89 (1989).
23
See infra notes 122-34, and accompanying text.
24
FINRA, supra note 16, at 2.
25
FINRA, supra note 16, at 2.
26
Id.
27
See Gedicks, supra note 4, at 544 & n.25 (listing arbitration awards that appear not to have
followed the recommendation condition precedent approach, notwithstanding general agreement of
courts and commentators on the requirement).
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
In re Peterzell v. Charles Schwab & Co., No. 88-02868, 1991 WL 202358, at *1 (Nat’l Ass’n of
Sec. Dealers, Inc. June 17, 1991).
31
Id.
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recommendation – it concluded Schwab had an “ongoing obligation” to ensure
claimant’s investments were suitable.32
In Quick & Reilly v. Barton, a firm was ordered to pay damages to a selfdescribed “compulsive trader” for letting him recklessly trade index options.33
Although the firm rendered no investment advice or recommendations, a New
York Stock Exchange Panel concluded that the firm had an ongoing responsibility
to monitor the trading and to take steps to stop it.34
PaineWebber was found to have breached a duty to monitor a customer’s
trading and to warn of increased unhedged risk in Trans National Group Services,
Inc. v. PaineWebber, Inc.35 The duty to monitor, the panel concluded, arose out of
“conversations” between claimant’s principal and the broker, and was breached
when the firm failed to adequately supervise the accounts.36 Commentators have
identified many recent examples of arbitrations, which appear to have disregarded
the BSE Interpretation, even in the context of on-line trading.37 These arbitrations
show that at least some Panels have concluded that ongoing suitability obligations
exist, in some circumstances, despite the absence of a “recommendation” or even
affirmative “investment advice.”38 In the words of one commentator:
[T]he suitability rule. . . is a substantive requirement that imposes on a brokerdealer “an obligation not to recommend a course of action clearly contrary to the
best interests of the customer, whether or not there was full disclosure.” . . . [T]here
is no bright-line test as to what constitutes a recommendation for purposes of Rule
2310, but rather a spectrum of situations, from a broker acting merely as an ordertaker, at the one extreme, and the urging by a broker of a customer to buy a
particular security, at the other. In between are a variety of situations in which it
39
may not be entirely clear whether or not the rule applies.

A number of SEC administrative decisions have similarly concluded that a
broker-dealer could have “an obligation not to recommend a course of action
clearly contrary to the best interests of the customer” in at least some
circumstances.40 The broker’s determination of what investment is in the “best
interests of the customer” requires the broker to match customer’s objectives to an
investment that will reasonably permit that objective to be reached; in other words,
the investment is “suitable” given those objectives and information the broker has
gleaned from his knowledge of the customer and his financial profile.41 One
central purpose of the Suitability Rule has been to attempt to professionalize

32

Id. at 2.
In re Quick & Reilly, Inc. v. Barton, 1990 WL 306396, at *1 (N.Y.S.E. Feb. 15, 1990).
34
Id.
35
In re Trans Nat’l Group Servs., Inc. v. PaineWebber, Inc., No. 91-00770, 1992 WL 472902, at
*6-7 (Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. June 30, 1992).
36
Id. at 6.
37
See, e.g., Gedicks, supra note 4, at 544 & n.25.
38
See, e.g., id. at 555.
39
Poser, supra note 8, at 1529-30 (emphasis added).
40
In re Powell & McGowan, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 7302, 41 SEC 933 (Apr. 24, 1964).
41
See id. at 2.
33
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investment advice.42 As set forth in Lange v. H. Hentz & Co.:
The purpose of the rules is found in the desire to professionalize the securities
industry. To that end, the ethical has been emphasized over the legal and as a result
the class of persons which has specially benefited from the adoption of [FINRA]
43
Rules is the class of security dealers and not the public.

The district judge in Lange cited the Report of the Special Study of
Securities Markets of the Securities and Exchange Commission which discussed
the need to improve the conduct of securities professionals and which evidenced a
“clear intent” to avoid “legalism” and concentrate on simple ethical guidelines:
[T]he [FINRA] rules themselves . . . for the most part, are affirmatively and rather
vaguely phrased in terms of what shall be rather than in terms of concrete
proscriptions. Thus for example, one is not directed not to recommend that which
is unsuitable but is instead directed to recommend that which is suitable. That
semantic difference is important, for in the former case the range of violations is
narrowed by restricting the penalty to the unsuitable match between the investor
and the security while in the latter case the suitable security is required to be
matched with the proper shareholder, an admirable but difficult challenge.44

In other words, FINRA Rules articulated broad goals and objectives for
industry professionals and, by avoiding “legalisms” hoped that self-regulation
would be sufficient to protect customers from unsuitable advice.45 The debate
continues as to whether sharply defined standards will more effectively meet the
conflicting interests of commission securities sales personnel and retail customers.
III.
A. Small v. Fritz – California “Holding Claims”
In 2003, the California Supreme Court, in Small v. Fritz Co. addressed
whether California law permitted plaintiffs to maintain Holding Claims.46 The
plaintiff held stock in the co-defendant corporation and claimed that the firm’s
officers fraudulently issued financial earnings reports that overstated the firm’s
earnings and profit.47 The misleading reports allegedly induced the plaintiff to
hold the corporation’s stock, and when the firm’s earnings and profits were
adjusted down, the plaintiff sustained economic damages.48
Citing the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, the Small court set forth its rationale:

42

See Lange v. H. Hentz & Co., 418 F. Supp. 1376, 1382 (D.Tex. 1976).
Id.
44
Id.
45
See id.
46
Small v. Fritz Co., 65 P.3d 1255 (Cal. 2003); see also Edward Gartenberg, The California
Supreme Court Recognizes Holding Claims for Securities Actions, 1MEALY’S EMERGING SECURITIES .
LITIG. 25 (Apr. 2003), available at http://library.findlaw.com/2003/ Dec/1/133178.html (discussing the
Small dissenting and concurring opinions).
47
Small, 65 P.3d at 1257-58.
48
Id. at 1258.
43
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Section 525 of the Restatement Second of Torts states: “One who fraudulently
makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention or law for the purpose of
inducing another to act or to refrain from action in reliance upon it, is subject to
liability to the other in deceit for pecuniary loss caused to him by his justifiable
reliance upon the misrepresentation.” . . . And section 551, subdivision (1) states:
“One who fails to disclose to another a fact that he knows may justifiably induce
the other to act or refrain from acting in a business transaction is subject to the
same liability to the other as though he had represented the nonexistence of the
matter that he has failed to disclose . . . .”California law has long recognized the
principle that induced forbearance can be the basis for tort liability . . . Gutman v.
Howard Sav. Bank (D.N.J. 1990) 748 F. Supp. 254, 264, upholding a holder’s
action based on forbearance under New York and New Jersey law, said: “Lies
which deceive and injure do not become innocent merely because the deceived
continue to do something rather than begin to do something else. Inducement is the
substance of reliance; the form of reliance-action or inaction-is not critical to the
49
actionability of fraud.”

The situation in Small can be analogized to the situation that frequently
arises in broker customer Holding Claim cases. A broker negligently advises a
customer to hold securities that, given changed risk-reward features of the security
and/or portfolio composition, should have been sold. Under Small, the customer
has the same suitability protections as investors negligently induced to buy, sell or
exchange securities.50
Such brokers, under Small, would be viewed as
affirmatively, not passively, negligent.51 They become responsible for all damages
proximately flowing from such negligence.52
The Small defendants argued that California should not recognize causes of
action for fraudulent or negligent inducement to hold securities when the issuing
firm trades on national markets and the subject representations are public
disclosures rather than private communications to the firm’s shareholders.53 The
defendants argued that the recognition of holding claims would invite
“nonmeritorious ‘strike’ suits designed to coerce settlements,”54 and that such
claims presented substantial proof problems regarding how a claimant would have
acted but for defendants’ misrepresentations.55
In rejecting defendants’ argument, the Small court explained that part of the
justification for the rule that a purchase or sale of a security must occur to have
standing under Rule 10b-5 was the express anticipation that claimants would have
state law causes of action covering the same misconduct even if not actionable
under the 1934 Act.56 Moreover, by deterring fraudulent and negligent
misrepresentations, the Small court reasoned that lawsuits for holding claims
would promote investor confidence in California’s financial markets and thereby

49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56

Id. at 1259 (third emphasis added).
Id. at 1260.
See id.
See Small, 65 P.3d at 1260.
Id.
Id. at 1260.
Id. at 1260-65.
Id. at 1262.
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counterbalance the deleterious effects of possible nuisance suits.57
To reduce the threat of nuisance suits and to mitigate concomitant proof
problems, the Small court announced that in claims for both fraudulent and
negligent inducement claims, plaintiffs must plead with great specificity the
“reliance” element.58
In a holder’s action a plaintiff must allege specific reliance on the defendants’
representations: for example, that if the plaintiff had read a truthful account of the
corporation’s financial status the plaintiff would have sold the stock, how many
shares the plaintiff would have sold, and when the sale would have taken place.
The plaintiff must allege actions distinguished from the unspoken and unrecorded
thoughts and decisions, that would indicate that the plaintiff actually relied on the
59
misrepresentations.

B. State Law on Holding Claims Move up
Only a handful of states clearly allow for such claim.60 California,61
Massachusetts, 62 and New Jersey,63 clearly do. Florida,64 New York,65 and
Illinois,66 and Wisconsin67 have cases of varying degrees of precedential force that
apparently permit holding claims.
In Texas, a state appellate court held that the state recognizes a cause of
action for inducement to hold securities, where an issuing firm’s executives held
face-to-face discussions with the plaintiff-investors and allegedly caused the

57

Small, 65 P.3d at 1264.
Id. at 1259.
59
Id. at 1265.
60
See David E. Robbins, Securities Arbitration Procedure Manual, (5th ed. 2001) § 5-5[d] (noting
that many states do not recognize holding claims and trenchantly analyzing the authority in those states
that apparently do).
61
Small, 65 P.3d at 1257.
62
Fottler v. Moseley, 60 N.E. 788 (Mass. 1901) (sustaining a claim against stock broker that
induced his client to withdraw a sell order of stock that eventually declined in value); David v. Belmont,
197 N.E. 83 (Mass. 1935) (affirming jury charge that banker and securities dealer would be liable to
customer for damages if it were found that customer relied on misrepresentations in deciding not to sell
his devalued securities).
63
Duffy v. Smith, 32 A. 371 (N.J. 1895) (holding that plaintiff had a cause of action against
defendant who induced him to hold stock in a company that eventually failed); Gutman v. Howard
Savings Bank, 748 F. Supp. 254, 262 (D.N.J. 1990). (predicting New Jersey would recognize holding
claims under common law based on state courts’ reluctance to dismiss novel tort claims and on cases
holding that inducing inaction furnishes a viable claim in other contexts).
64
Rogers v. Cisco Sys., 268 F. Supp.2d 1305, 1314 (N.D. Fla. 2003) (extrapolating from Florida
state cases to predict that “Florida courts would recognize a cause of action in fraud or negligent
misrepresentation for [a] holding claim[.]”).
65
Kaufmann v. Delafield, 229 N.Y.S. 545, 546-47 (N.Y. App. Div. 1928) (recognizing plaintiff had
a cause of action against the defendant that purportedly induced him to retain stock); Gutman, 748 F.
Supp. at 263 (“The Court concludes that, under New York law, a plaintiff may state a common law
fraud claim against a defendant whose misrepresentations caused plaintiff to hold securities which
plaintiff otherwise would have sold.”).
66
Gordon v. Buntrock, No. 99 CH 18378 (C.C. Ill. July 19, 2004).
67
Seideman v. Sheboygan Loan & Trust Co., 223 N.W. 430, (Wisc. 1929) (recognizing a cause of
action against defendant corporate officers that induced plaintiff to hold devalued notes.)
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plaintiffs to hold the firm’s securities to their financial detriment.68 On unrelated
grounds, however, the appellate court withdrew the opinion and, in a new decision,
granted defendant’s summary judgment and failed to address whether holding
claims were actionable going forward.69 Other states, for example, Connecticut70
and probably Georgia,71 apparently do not recognize holding claims.
C. Agency Based Argument Regarding Holding Claims
Commentators have recognized that FINRA’s suitability rule has been
forged from agency and fiduciary law and that the doctrinal underpinnings
supporting the suitability rule and legal cause of action for its breach may warrant
additional investor protections.72 Agency law operates with “shingle theory,” a
variant of fiduciary law, to warrant holding brokers liable for failing to inform
unsophisticated customers of their unsuitable investment decisions, even when
brokers make no “recommendation.”73 In essence, a broker is his customer’s agent
by force of their agreement to enter into an ongoing relationship whereby the latter
purchases and sells securities for the customer’s account in accordance with the
customer’s instructions. As the customer’s agent, the broker owes a duty to
disclose material information relevant to the objectives for which the agent was
retained:
Agents have long been held to owe a specific duty to give or to provide material
information to the principal about the matter entrusted to the agent. This duty
obligates the agent to communicate to the principal any relevant information in the
agent’s possession of which the agent knows or should know that the principal is
not aware, but of which the principal would want to be informed. The provision of
such information enables the principal to maintain the principal’s rightful control of
the agent and the purpose of the agency, by revising or rescinding earlier
instructions, issuing additional instructions, changing the focus of the agency, or
terminating it altogether (citations omitted).74

With respect to those matters to which the customer has entrusted the broker
to act on his behalf, the broker has an ongoing duty to provide the customer with
relevant material information. Of course, this says nothing about the ends to which
the agency relationship was entered in the first place. If, as the cases suggest, the
customer enters into a contract with the broker that provides the broker will only
execute transactions at the customer’s behest, then at first blush it seems correct
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Shrivanian v. Defrates, 2004 WL 2610509, withdrawn 161 S.W.3d 102, 105 (Tex. App. 2005).
Shrivanian v. Defrates, 161 S.W.3d 102.
70
See Chanoff v. United States Surgical Corp., 857 F. Supp 1011 (D. Conn.), aff’d, 31 F.3d 66 (2d
Cir. 1994).
71
See In re WorldCom Sec. Litig., 336 F. Supp. 2d 310, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (Cote, J.) (predicting
that Georgia state law would not recognize holding claims).
72
Gedicks, supra note 4, at 546; See also Rapp, supra note 6, at 194-95.
73
Gedicks, supra note 4, at 546. See also Rapp, supra note 6, at 196 (“The ‘Shingle Theory’ of
liability simply holds that a broker’s solicitation and acceptance of orders from customers constitutes an
implied representation by the broker that she will deal fairly with those customers in the usual manner
and in accordance with trade custom and practice.”) (citation omitted).
74
Gedicks, supra note 4, at 571.
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that the only duties the broker owes are to faithfully and diligently execute
transactions. Not surprisingly, in arbitrations and litigations, both discount and
full-service brokers alike refer to language in the account contract that provides
that the customer makes all final decisions regarding securities transactions.75
D. Shingle Theory
Enter “shingle theory” and its underlying support in fiduciary law. By
holding themselves out as professionals with expertise in financial markets,
brokers implicitly represent and thereby instill in their customers the expectation
that they will deal “equitably and fairly” with them.76 This implied obligation to
act equitably and fairly—rather than exploit the customer—is a general fiduciary
duty that the Commission and FINRA rely upon in issuing rules and regulations to
“mitigate [the] harsh consequences that otherwise would ensue when a person is
made vulnerable by his or her reasonable reliance on the superior knowledge, skill,
or position of” brokers.77
The unsuitability of any security recommended by the broker-dealer is thus a fact
that is material to the agency relationship and of which the broker-dealer should
know that the customer would want to be informed. It is also clear that the just and
equitable treatment of customers demanded by the shingle theory requires that the
broker-dealer disclose the unsuitability of any recommended security.78

Under shingle theory, in inducing customers to rely upon financial firms’
expertise, firms cloak themselves with general fiduciary duties to their customers
to treat them fairly and equitably. On the strength of shingle theory’s legal and
normative force, one commentator concludes:
A consideration of the equities counsels in favor of imposition of a duty to warn
even on discount brokers. Advertising by discount firms frequently emphasizes
easy profits, and rarely emphasizes risk. Discount advertising also typically targets
middle- and lower-middle-class investors with little knowledge of or experience
with direct securities investing, and who are often unable to sustain substantial
losses in their portfolios.
Additionally, bulk commission discounts and
commission-free trading promotions to encourage the opening of discount accounts
encourage unprofitable frequent trading. (citations omitted)79

If agency law and “shingle theory” combined support holding brokers liable
for failing to warn customers of the unsuitability of securities transactions even
when the broker makes no recommendation whatsoever, it lends far more support
to hold a broker liable for affirmatively recommending that a customer hold an
unsuitable security.
When a broker affirmatively advises a customer to hold a security, that
advice is plainly material to the agency relationship. The customer sought the
75
76
77
78
79

Id. at 541-43.
Id. at 557.
Id. at 562.
Id. at 574.
Gedicks, supra note 4, at 572.
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broker’s counsel to further his investment objectives. Conversely, when the broker
and his firm hold themselves out as offering state-of-the-art financial stratagems
and theories in working to meet the customer’s objectives, it is neither equitable or
fair to limit those obligations to recommendations to buy, sell or exchange advice
contrary to the advertising of brokerage firms. Shingle theory and its touchstone in
fiduciary law favor deterring firms from instilling expectations in customers that
said firms may then contract out of in opening account papers; a bait and switch
which no average customer would suspect.
IV.
How many customers would be willing to pay full-boat commissions to
purported “full service” brokers if these brokers told them they would function as
nothing more than order-takers, that they were not obliged to review any of their
customer’s investments, and that, if they happened to offer a customer utterly
incompetent advice, there would be no recourse against them because they signed
form documents that say “broker” as opposed to “investment advisor?” How
different are the services, so described, from those that a discount brokerage
supplies at substantially reduced fees?
A. Broker Advertising
Many broker-dealer firms market their investment services by advertising
their brokers as investment “advisors” ready to provide sophisticated investment
guidance regarding the composition of portfolios:
To meet negative images and perceptions over the years, the “customers’ man” of
old, or the later vintage “account executive,” is today a “Financial Adviser,”
“Financial Consultant,” “Investment Consultant” or, more generally, an
“investment professional.” . . . such titles connote something different from
“salesperson,” and imply more than a marketing strategy. Diversified “asset
gathering” approaches to servicing investment clientele, and the rise of fee-based
business among stockbrokers through money-management consulting, or so-called
“wrap” accounts. . . illustrate at least an evolving shift from salesperson to
consultant. . . Brokerage firm marketing materials eschew the notion that
investment professionals simply recommend investments and execute
transactions.80

Another commentator writes:
Brokerage firms seek to encourage customers to believe that their salespersons are
professionals upon whom the customers can rely for expert investment advice. This
is made patently clear by their advertising, which emphasizes that brokerage firms
can be trusted to give investment advice, designating their salespersons as
“financial consultants,” “financial advisors,” or “account executives”; and in other
ways in their customer contacts.81

80
81

Rapp, supra note 6, at 218-19.
Poser, supra note 8, at 1534.

2008

ENTITLEMENTS IN CONTEMPORARY MARKETS

135

The same commentator set-forth the following examples of industry
advertising:
A review of the web sites of several brokerage firms shows that they encourage the
public to depend on them for investment advice. Typical slogans are “Advising
Investors for Over a Century” (Legg Mason), “Your Guide to the Financial World”
(First Union Securities), “We Help You Invest Responsibly” (Fidelity Investments),
“We want your business, we’ll earn your trust” (Ferris Baker Watts), and “We
Measure Success One Investor at a Time” (Morgan Stanley). Titles such as
“financial advisor” or “financial consultant” “are pregnant with important legal
meaning,” since they invite the customer to enter into a relationship of “trust,
confidence and dependence” with the broker. Rapp, supra note 3, at 190 n.3. Paine
Webber, for example, provides consulting services to institutions and wealthy
individuals. Among the services it offers are “asset allocation advice and the
evaluation, recommendation and ongoing analysis of investment managers.”
UBS/PaineWebber, Corporate & Institutional Services Homepage, at
http://www.ubsPaineWebber.com/index.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2001).82

Their websites show firms were still making the same sorts of statements
until recently. On the home page of Ferris Baker Watts, “We want your business,
we’ll earn your trust,” flickers across the screen.83 The corporate philosophy,
likewise displayed on the home page, states: “Since 1900, Ferris Baker Watts,
Incorporated has maintained a very basic philosophy: focus on the needs of our
individual and corporate clients by placing our experience and services at their
disposal to help them reach their financial goals.”84 The link to obtain basic
information about Wachovia Securities provides:
Why Wachovia Securities? [. . .]
We prosper by helping you prosper. That simple fact is at the center of everything
we do. Our Financial Advisors listen and respond to your financial needs. They
have the knowledge and resources to help you take control of your financial future.
When you select a Wachovia Securities Financial Advisor, we realize you have
chosen us over scores of alternatives in a highly competitive industry. We will
work hard to earn your trust each time we serve you.
Our Mission. To combine the strength and heritage of our firm with the insight,
concern, and experience of our associates to give clients objective, individualized
advice and service that will help them achieve their long-term financial goals.85

The link on Merrill Lynch’s homepage that provides information on the
firm’s “Individual Investors” programs currently states:
What a Merrill Lynch Financial Advisor Can Do for You
[Y]our Merrill Lynch Financial Advisor will work with you to develop strategies
that can help you achieve your most important goals, whether you’re saving for
your children’s education, buying a home, growing your business, or building a
82
83
84
85

Id., at 1534-35 ns.157-58.
Ferris, Baker Watts, Inc., http://www.fbw.com.
Id.
Wachovia Securities, http://www.wachoviasec.com/wachoviasec/WachoviaSecCommand.
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legacy for your family. . . Merrill Lynch Financial Advisors are supported by the
full breadth of the firm’s vast resources, including its world-class investment
research, which they apply to help their clients manage their portfolios effectively.
Depending on your needs, your Financial Advisor also may arrange for you to
access the services of institutional-level investment managers through the Merrill
Lynch Consults program.86

Brokers continue to hold themselves out as doing far more than just
executing the buy-sell-exchange recommendations of their customers; they are
regularly advertising that they are engaged in the same types of activities as
investment advisors. Requiring broker-dealer firms to apply the most current and
effective strategies of financial economics would do little more than hold them to
do what their advertising suggests they are already doing. As the SEC has recently
stated:
The terms “financial advisor” and “financial consultant,” for example, are
descriptive of such services provided by broker-dealers. As part of their ongoing
business, full service broker-dealers consult with or advise customers as to their
finances. Indeed, terms such as “financial advisor” and “financial consultant” are
among the many generic terms that describe what various persons in the financial
services industry do, including banks, trust companies, insurance companies, and
commodity professionals. Moreover, we are concerned that any list of proscribed
names we develop could lead to the development of new ones with similar
connotations. We believe the better approach, which we are adopting today, is to
require broker-dealers to inform clients clearly that they are entering into a
brokerage, and not an advisory, relationship. The customer disclosure requirements,
which we discuss above, must be included in all customer documents for fee-based
brokerage accounts. We encourage brokers to consider making similar disclosure in
other communications.87

In a recent article, one commentator observed that:
[I]t may be advisable to incorporate language in nondiscretionary customer
agreements, or in an attached document, to the following effect:
You understand that we are under no obligation to provide you with
information or advice affecting your trading decisions. However, we may
from time to time provide you with such information or advice, at your
request or as a courtesy to you. You expressly acknowledge that you are
solely responsible for all trading decisions made in your account, regardless
of any information or advice you may or may not receive from us. You
understand and acknowledge that our providing such information or advice
does not impose on us any obligation to provide any continuing information
or advice, to update or modify previously provided information or advice, or
to provide you with conflicting information or advice of which we may be

86
Merrill Lynch, http://www.totalmerrill.com/TotalMerrill/pages/WorkingWithMerrillLynch.aspx?
referrer=mlcom.
87
Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not to be Investment Advisors, Exchange Act Release No.
51523, 2005 WL 991247, at *20 (Apr. 12,2005).
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aware.88

The reason such language was being suggested by this commentator was
because customers who are paying full commissions believe the types of
statements being made in the advertising. They reasonably believe they are paying
for the “special expertise” of their brokers with respect to portfolio construction
and portfolio management and the suggested language would provide a basis, that
currently does not exist, for denying customers any claim against brokers who are
engaging in services that the customers would reasonably interpret as the type of
services for which they are paying. This leads to a broader question. To
what
extent will the law enforce brokerage form agreements where legal obligations are
being created in a manner that indisputably compromises the customer’s
reasonable (advertisement-based) expectations and insulates brokers from
liabilities that a customer would reasonably expect exist for incompetent service?89
Some commentators have argued suitability obligations should be deemed
triggered when advice to hold securities is given:
[T]he broker-dealer’s obligation to give suitable investment advice is not triggered
solely when a recommendation to purchase or sell a security is involved . . . . As a
practical matter, a customer is often in contact with his or her broker to discuss
whether he or she should change any of the investments currently in his or her
account. Advice to retain current holdings should be as much subject to the
suitability requirement as advice to add new securities to, or eliminate securities
from, one’s portfolio . . . not just a recommendation to purchase, sell or exchange a
security. . . So long as a customer maintains an inappropriate portfolio of securities
in his account and the broker-dealer has reason to believe that the investor is still
relying on the broker-dealer’s firm for advice, a continuing breach of fiduciary duty
should be seen as occurring as to the entire portfolio . . . Maintenance of the
persisting inappropriate investment strategy constitutes a continuing wrong
committed by the broker-dealer.90

Such advice, in many cases, directly affects the integrity and risk
characteristics of their portfolios and is often the reason a full service broker was
sought in the first place.91 What is the basis for imposing such duties? Agency
theory, discussed above, provides one such source.92 Public policy provides
another source. Brokers, as commission sales personnel, have financial incentives
to respond to customers and to provide more, rather than less investment advice to
them. Doing so encourages customers to trust them and feel their financial

88
Richard A. Rosen, The Kwiatkowski Decision: Implications for the Nature and Scope of Duties of
Brokers and FCM’s to Their Customers, 22 No. 9 Futures and Derivatives Law Report (Dec. 2002).
89
On the other hand, a number of commentators have urged that requiring firms to apply the
insights of modern portfolio theory would impose substantial costs on firms. See, e.g., Willa E. Gibson,
Investors, Look Before You Leap: The Suitability Doctrine is Not Suitable for OTC Derivatives Dealers,
29 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 527, 573 (1998) (imposing suitability obligations in financial derivatives
transactions would impose on the dealer additional responsibility of determining if the counter-party
understood the investment risks and whether the counter-party used its own independent judgment in
entering into the derivatives transaction).
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Friedman, supra note 7, at 315-16.
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Id.
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Gedicks, supra note 4.
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situation is in good hands.
It is highly unlikely that most customers distinguish technically “gratuitous”
investment “advisory service” from investment advice provided by brokers in the
context of a “full service” relationship. To the extent firms hold their brokers out
as highly trained, full service investment professionals, not order-takers, and
attempt to cultivate relations of trust and confidence with respect to the provision
of investment services, customers paying full-boat commissions will continue to
reasonably believe part of the “full boat” is the investment advice they are
receiving. Providing brokers and firms with a get-out-of-jail-free card based on a
distinction between the services brokers and investment advisors provide is
effectively a bait-and-switch.
B. Assessment of Holding Claims as a Species of Suitability Claim
Firms’ advertising induces public customers to trust substantially all
investment advice brokers provide; absent an ongoing disclaimer that the services
are really gratuitous and that incompetent holding advice is not actionable, clients
simply assume advice being given is advice they are paying for within the meaning
of “full service.” It should not be the customer’s responsibility to figure out that no
matter how sub-standard and injurious advice may be relative to customer
objectives, the firm is insulated from liability. Where form agreements disclaim
responsibilities in a manner inconsistent with firm advertising, the quality of duty a
firm owes to its clients should be a function of what the firm stated to the public to
induce the customer/firm relationship. Courts have cited common law sources and
the Restatements in finding such duty.93 The question whether to recognize
“holding claims” in non-discretionary accounts turns on how competing policies
are assessed.
1. Defense Counsel Arguments Against Holding Claims
At least five central arguments favor non-recognition of such a claim.
Defense counsel should argue all of them.
First, the BSE Interpretation is consistent with the precise language of Rule
2310; if the rules drafters wished to include holding claims, they would have said
buy, sell, exchange or hold, but they did not do so, presumably for a valid reason.
Second, the BSE Interpretation is consistent with federal law, which
93
See, e.g., Union Bank of Switzerland v. HS Equities, 457 F. Supp. 515, 522 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(broker was “under a duty to supervise plaintiff's account with reasonable care, to keep plaintiff fully
advised as to the condition of the account, not to mislead plaintiff as to its status, and not to act in its
self-interest at the expense of the plaintiff. In sum [broker] was required to keep plaintiff fully
informed as to material matters that could affect plaintiff's judgment with respect to transactions which
were the subject of its account.” Id. at 522. The court noted that “the duty to keep plaintiff fully
informed flows from the broker-customer relationship whether characterized as fiduciary or agency.”
Id. at 522 n.12 (citations omitted) “Similarly, the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 380 (1958) states
that implied in an agency relationship is the duty of the agent to inform the principal of matters
‘relevant to affairs entrusted to him and which, as the agent has notice, the principal would desire to
have.’” (citing, inter alia, N.Y. Jurisprudence, Brokers 30 (1959) (“Generally, a broker is under a duty
to disclose to his employer all the material information which he may possess or obtain concerning the
transaction involved.”)). Id. at 522 n.12.
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precludes holding claims under the purchaser/seller rule for reasons tracing to the
ease with which such claims can be made, difficulty defending them and
complexities of litigation.
Third, the BSE Interpretation is consistent with the Second Circuit’s
transaction-by-transaction approach in De Kwiatkowsi v. Bear Stearns & Co.,
Inc.,94 which relies on settled law that brokers servicing non-discretionary accounts
have no duties between transactions and only have duties to provide honestly
believed information and competent execution of customer directed transactions,
with all such duties circumscribed by customer agreements.95
Fourth, the BSE Interpretation is consistent with the notion that securities
liability can only arise where there has been a purchase or sale security
transactions – holder claims rely on the idea that there can be liability for inducing
someone not to enter into a securities transaction, a proposition for which there is
little historical authority.
Fifth, under the BSE Rule and transaction-by-transaction approach, costs are
lessened because no continuous oversight of the portfolio is necessary and brokers
need not make any effort to determine the risk characteristics of the portfolio. They
just need to execute orders with no potential liability for their advice.
2. Claimants’ Counsel Arguments Favoring Recognition of Holding
Claims
At least five central arguments favor recognition of such a claim. Claimants’
counsel should argue all of them.
First, a “recommendation,” clarified by FINRA as a “call to action” should
be interpreted in terms of whether the advice alters the risks of a customer
94

De Kwiatkowski v. Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc., 306 F.3d 1293 (2d Cir. 2002).
See generally Lieb v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 951, 952-53
(E.D. Mich. 1978). In a non-discretionary account the broker’s duties include becoming familiar with
the stock being recommended, “inform[ing] the customer of the risks involved in purchasing or selling”
the security at issue, “the duty to refrain from self-dealing or refusing to disclose any personal interest
the broker may have in a particular recommended security,” and “the duty not to misrepresent any fact
material to the transaction”; in non-discretionary accounts. Id. at 953. The fiduciary duty is limited with
each transaction being viewed separately -- the broker is bound to act in the customer's interest when
transacting business for the account, but all duties to the customer cease "when the transaction is
closed." Caravan Mobile Home Sales, Inc. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc., 769 F.2d 561, 567 (9th
Cir. 1985).Where an account is non-discretionary, the broker's fiduciary relationship to the client is
limited to the making of specific purchase and sale recommendations and the effecting transactions
selected by the customer -- the broker has no ongoing duty to provide the customer with information
about a stock after purchase is complete and the giving of advice triggers no ongoing duty to do so. Id.
However, Lieb also distinguishes circumstances in which extra-contractual duties are imposed upon a
broker under the theory of de facto control. Lieb, 461 F.Supp. at 953-54. De facto control will be
deemed to have occurred where, in reviewing the course of dealing between the parties, the
circumstances are such as to effectively render the client dependent upon the broker. De Kwiatkowski,
306 F.3d at 1308. These special circumstances exist where, for example the client “has impaired
faculties, or has a closer than arms-length relationship with the broker, or who is so lacking in
sophistication that de facto control of the account is deemed to rest in the broker.” Id. When de facto
control is exercised by the financial advisor, the broker clearly owes the customer not only a fiduciary
duty with regard to each individual transaction but also a fiduciary duty, on an ongoing basis, to the
total account, which includes all of the broad fiduciary duties that are owed by brokers handling
discretionary accounts. Lieb, 461 F. Supp at 954.
95
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portfolio. Inaction, when action is appropriate, is really “doing something.”96
Second, permitting holder claims to be heard in arbitration is consistent with
the status of state law holding claims.
Third, because advice to hold securities affects portfolio risk just as much as
advice to buy, sell or exchange securities, a duty to advise customers properly
exists and can be justified under agency and shingle theories.
Fourth, as detailed in Small v. Fritz Companies, there is no critical
distinction between fraudulent buy/sell advice and fraudulent advice that induces a
claimant to hold securities to his detriment.97 Inducing an investor to hold
securities places him in the same economic position as if the broker advised him to
buy the security.98
Fifth, requiring brokers to live up to their own advertising makes good sense
as a policy matter, particularly where such advertisements induce potential
customers to sign on with full service firms, but the obligations the firms represent
they have, in boiler-plate contracts, are inconsistent with their advertising.99
Finally, the law generally finds that duties should be placed on the party who
can avoid the risk of harm at the least cost, and that is, plainly, the broker-dealer.
Imposing these duties would not shift to the broker the responsibility for
institutional investments that go wrong or make the broker a guarantor of the
success of the institution’s investments. It would simply make a broker-dealer, as a
trained professional in the securities industry, responsible for making affirmative
recommendations that it knows, or ought to know, are unsuitable for its
institutional customers. Placing the responsibility on the broker for the suitability
of its recommendations would promote efficiency, fairness, and the honesty of the
markets. The rule would be efficient because the broker-dealer is usually in a
better position than the customer to learn the essential facts and degree of risk
concerning a security that it is recommending, and can do so at a lower cost.100
IV. CONCLUSION
Where an investor, upon his broker’s advice, decides to hold a position rather
than sell it, the investor may be deemed to have made a “second investment
decision” to accept the market risk of continued security ownership. His decision
to “hold” is, economically, equivalent to a repurchase of his position at the

96
The “call to action” theory may also be inconsistent with the so-called “second investment rule.”
Assume a buyer purchases securities on the basis of fraud later learns of the fraud, but nevertheless
decides to hold the position. If the securities then decline, the buyers “second investment decision” to
hold the securities is thought to break the chain of causation between the initial misrepresentation and
the buyer’s subsequent financial injury; the second investment decision “ratifies” the first even though
it is a decision “to hold” the initially purchased securities.
97
See Small v. Fritz Companies, 30 Cal. 4th 167, (Cal. 2003).
98
Id.
99
Poser, supra note 8, at 1519 (“Here, the question is whether it is cheaper and more efficient to
place suitability obligations on broker-dealers [requiring] them to police their sales personnel
effectively, on the one hand, or to require institutional investors to hire sophisticated investment officers
or retain sophisticated independent investment advisers, on the other.”).
100
Id. at 1570.
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prevailing market price and can affect portfolio risk as much as if a new position
were purchased. A “second investment decision” of this type represents “action”
taken by an investor.
If one investor, accepting a broker recommendation, holds the security
position he already had rather than selling it, he is in the same position, relative to
risk, as a second investor, accepting a broker’s recommendation to purchase a new
position in the same security. It makes no sense to deem only the investment
purchase decision of the second investor in response to the recommendation to be
governed by suitability standards.
Portfolios left untended will, over time, become unsuitable due to random
market forces regardless of investment objective. Portfolio “management” is
designed to bring portfolios “into line” with a steadily maintained investment risk
profile. The portfolio adjustments necessary to maintain a desired risk profile will
include buying, selling – in whole or in part – and holding security positions within
the portfolio, which is why suitability rules have long required that the
composition of existing security holdings be taken into account in determining the
suitability of any incremental recommendation to alter portfolio investments.
If a customer accepts a broker’s “hold” recommendation and thus maintains
a risk exposure that would otherwise have been terminated, it is an artifice that
does disservice to securities industry principles of commercial honor and fair
dealing to characterize such a customer decision as “doing nothing.”
Just as if one were to maintain cruise speed while approaching a controlled
traffic intersection, rather than slow down by application of a brake, a heightened
degree of risk would inherently be assumed that could be characterized as
excessive, or even reckless. No driving instructor, having advised his student to
maintain his speed, could expect to evade responsibility behind an artifice that he
only recommended “doing nothing,” and that the ensuing collision was not a
foreseeable consequence of the driver’s reliance on his non-trivial
recommendation, and the driver’s resultant “action” to refrain from measures
customarily taken to avoid perceived risk.
The BSE Interpretation leaves a large body of investment advice affecting
customer portfolio risk unregulated by suitability standards. It is exactly this type
of advice that customers, based on broker advertising, have reason to believe is a
service being provided as part of a full service contract. Restating our thesis,
FINRA’s “suitability rule” should be interpreted to govern all broker-customer
communications that constitute non-trivial investment advice regarding portfolio
composition, not just buy, sell or exchange communications; per current
interpretation.

